Global Deterrence and Strike
UNCLASSIFIED
DETERRENCE An Evolving Concept
16 Nov 2006 LTC Randy Bentz J53, Plans Division USSTRATCOM UNCLASSIFIED
Approach
z z z
The Challenge The Framework Making it Useful
UNCLASSIFIED
Deterrence – Traditional View z
Deterrence-The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. (Joint Pub 1-02 definition)
“Deterrence by Punishment” Focus
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Deterrence Defined Deterrence: Deterrence convinces adversaries not to take actions that threaten US vital interests by means of decisive influence over their decision making. Decisive influence is achieved by credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs, while encouraging restraint by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome. (Deterrence Operations JOC, April 2006)
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
The Challenge z
Wide-array of less well understood adversaries – –
z z z
Different adversaries will require different US deterrent means Widely varying adversary risk-taking propensity Asymmetry of stake vs. Asymmetry of power –
–
z
Deterrence is about influencing perceptions, which vary widely Increased complexity and more potential for miscalculation
U.S. military supremacy alone not a guarantee of deterrence success Asymmetry of stake undercuts the credibility of U.S. deterrent messages
Unique characteristics of non-state actors – – –
Risk tolerance Lines of communications Decision making frameworks
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Synopsis of the Central Idea z
Must decisively influence adversary’s decision calculus – – –
z
Deterrence by Imposing Cost – –
z
Traditional view of deterrence: punishment But achieved through offensive and defensive means
Deterrence by Denying Benefit – –
z
An adversary’s perceptions are his reality Focus of planning must be on his perception, not our own Adversary decision making processes are discernable in most cases
Credible threat to deny adversary’s strategic objectives Especially important when stakes are asymmetric or addressing nonstate actors
Deterrence by Encouraging Restraint – – –
Influence adversary perceptions of what will happen if he does not act Convince adversary that he still has “room to maneuver” Not acting is the best of all available options
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Deterrence Considerations z z
Successful deterrence activities require up-front planning, not ad-hoc measures taken only in time of crises No single “magic bullet” for success –
–
z
There are multiple “ways” to deter –
–
z
All the tools of modern warfare can contribute to strategic deterrence success Much deterrence capability resides outside of DoD Planners should integrate multiple methods and not rely on any one strategy Integration will reveal necessary balances and trade-offs
Deterrence is not just a DoD or USSTRATCOM problem –
–
Requires integration and synchronization of all instruments of national power Requires regional and global perspective and integration Must “Plan to Deter”, not “Deter by Planning to Defeat”
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Strategic Decision-Making Framework • Objective: Decisively influence an adversary’s strategic decisions. • Method: Shape his perception of benefits and costs of hostile action and his perception of the costs and benefits of inaction. Illustrative Example: Deter country X from using chemical weapons in situation Y.
Adversary’s Perceived Outcomes
T C A
DO
N’ TA
Adversary Decision: “Should I use chemical weapons in this situation?”
UNCLASSIFIED
CT
Perceived Benefits: • coerce neighbors • inc. local support • etc.
Perceived Costs: • prompt US attack • loss of prestige • etc.
s ce n e qu tion e ns c Co of A
Perceived Costs: • lose initiative • military coup • etc.
Perceived Benefits: • maintain image • economic benefit • etc.
s ce n e t qu rain e ns est o C fR o
Undermine Deterrence
Enhance Deterrence Illustrative Data
UNCLASSIFIED
Core Concept: Exercising Decisive Influence Adversary’s perception is reality! Implied Nuclear Threat
Objective: Deter Iraq from using chemical weapons
Adversary’s Perceived Benefits of Action
Active Defense to counter SCUDs
Adversary’s Perceived Costs of Action
CoR
Limited US Objective: Liberation of Kuwait
Adversary’s Perceived Consequences of Restraint (CoR) (“What will happen to me if I don’t act now?”)
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Making it Useful Objective z
Deter actor X from action Y in scenario Z
Assess Adversary Decision Calculus z z z
Develop adversary strategic profile Develop decision scenario(s) Evaluate adversary perceptions of: z z z z
z z z z
Benefits of Action Costs of Action Costs of Restraint Benefits of Restraint
Identify critical perception factors Identify key perception uncertainties- PIR Identify potential leverage points Vet results with Intelligence Community
Execute & Monitor Options z
Refine Plans z
z
z
z
z
Develop Desired Effects z
Based on adversary perception Effects enhance costs of action, benefits of restraint
Develop / Identify options that support course(s) of action Determine capabilities required to execute options Balance required capabilities against available resources Make employment recommendations
Develop/Assess Deterrent Actions z
z
Generate new assessment?
z z z
Develop actions to achieve effects Assess intended and unintended impacts of potential actions Prioritize potential actions Develop measures of effectiveness Recommend course(s) of action
UNCLASSIFIED Adversary Plan Conflict Scenarios
Other Scenarios
Global Deterrence Integration Modifications to: • Objectives • Effects • Actions Actual vs. Intended Outcome Satisfy Objectives?
Desired Effects Actions COAs
GD&S Cycle
Options • •Options Options database database • •Planning Planning tools tools
MOE Developed Intel Collection Plan BDA Force Management •• Analysis Analysis •• Recommendations Recommendations
Required Capabilities by Mission Area
UNCLASSIFIED
Global GlobalForce ForceStatus Status ISR Info ISR InfoOps Ops Global GlobalStrike Strike Cyber CyberOps Ops Missile Def C2 Missile Def C2
Employment Recommendations
Other Other Capabilities Capabilities • •Diplomatic Diplomatic • •Information Information • •Economic Economic
Integrated Integratedsystem systemof: of: Plans Plans Real-time Real-timeforce forceData Data Situational Awareness Situational Awareness Analysis Analysis
USSTRATCOM J5
DETERRENCE An Evolving Concept
16 Nov 2006 LTC Randy Bentz J53, Plans Division USSTRATCOM UNCLASSIFIED
Approach
z z z
The Challenge The Framework Making it Useful
UNCLASSIFIED
Deterrence – Traditional View z
Deterrence-The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. (Joint Pub 1-02 definition)
“Deterrence by Punishment” Focus
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Deterrence Defined Deterrence: Deterrence convinces adversaries not to take actions that threaten US vital interests by means of decisive influence over their decision making. Decisive influence is achieved by credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs, while encouraging restraint by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome. (Deterrence Operations JOC, April 2006)
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
The Challenge z
Wide-array of less well understood adversaries – –
z z z
Different adversaries will require different US deterrent means Widely varying adversary risk-taking propensity Asymmetry of stake vs. Asymmetry of power –
–
z
Deterrence is about influencing perceptions, which vary widely Increased complexity and more potential for miscalculation
U.S. military supremacy alone not a guarantee of deterrence success Asymmetry of stake undercuts the credibility of U.S. deterrent messages
Unique characteristics of non-state actors – – –
Risk tolerance Lines of communications Decision making frameworks
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Synopsis of the Central Idea z
Must decisively influence adversary’s decision calculus – – –
z
Deterrence by Imposing Cost – –
z
Traditional view of deterrence: punishment But achieved through offensive and defensive means
Deterrence by Denying Benefit – –
z
An adversary’s perceptions are his reality Focus of planning must be on his perception, not our own Adversary decision making processes are discernable in most cases
Credible threat to deny adversary’s strategic objectives Especially important when stakes are asymmetric or addressing nonstate actors
Deterrence by Encouraging Restraint – – –
Influence adversary perceptions of what will happen if he does not act Convince adversary that he still has “room to maneuver” Not acting is the best of all available options
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Deterrence Considerations z z
Successful deterrence activities require up-front planning, not ad-hoc measures taken only in time of crises No single “magic bullet” for success –
–
z
There are multiple “ways” to deter –
–
z
All the tools of modern warfare can contribute to strategic deterrence success Much deterrence capability resides outside of DoD Planners should integrate multiple methods and not rely on any one strategy Integration will reveal necessary balances and trade-offs
Deterrence is not just a DoD or USSTRATCOM problem –
–
Requires integration and synchronization of all instruments of national power Requires regional and global perspective and integration Must “Plan to Deter”, not “Deter by Planning to Defeat”
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Strategic Decision-Making Framework • Objective: Decisively influence an adversary’s strategic decisions. • Method: Shape his perception of benefits and costs of hostile action and his perception of the costs and benefits of inaction. Illustrative Example: Deter country X from using chemical weapons in situation Y.
Adversary’s Perceived Outcomes
T C A
DO
N’ TA
Adversary Decision: “Should I use chemical weapons in this situation?”
UNCLASSIFIED
CT
Perceived Benefits: • coerce neighbors • inc. local support • etc.
Perceived Costs: • prompt US attack • loss of prestige • etc.
s ce n e qu tion e ns c Co of A
Perceived Costs: • lose initiative • military coup • etc.
Perceived Benefits: • maintain image • economic benefit • etc.
s ce n e t qu rain e ns est o C fR o
Undermine Deterrence
Enhance Deterrence Illustrative Data
UNCLASSIFIED
Core Concept: Exercising Decisive Influence Adversary’s perception is reality! Implied Nuclear Threat
Objective: Deter Iraq from using chemical weapons
Adversary’s Perceived Benefits of Action
Active Defense to counter SCUDs
Adversary’s Perceived Costs of Action
CoR
Limited US Objective: Liberation of Kuwait
Adversary’s Perceived Consequences of Restraint (CoR) (“What will happen to me if I don’t act now?”)
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Making it Useful Objective z
Deter actor X from action Y in scenario Z
Assess Adversary Decision Calculus z z z
Develop adversary strategic profile Develop decision scenario(s) Evaluate adversary perceptions of: z z z z
z z z z
Benefits of Action Costs of Action Costs of Restraint Benefits of Restraint
Identify critical perception factors Identify key perception uncertainties- PIR Identify potential leverage points Vet results with Intelligence Community
Execute & Monitor Options z
Refine Plans z
z
z
z
z
Develop Desired Effects z
Based on adversary perception Effects enhance costs of action, benefits of restraint
Develop / Identify options that support course(s) of action Determine capabilities required to execute options Balance required capabilities against available resources Make employment recommendations
Develop/Assess Deterrent Actions z
z
Generate new assessment?
z z z
Develop actions to achieve effects Assess intended and unintended impacts of potential actions Prioritize potential actions Develop measures of effectiveness Recommend course(s) of action
UNCLASSIFIED Adversary Plan Conflict Scenarios
Other Scenarios
Global Deterrence Integration Modifications to: • Objectives • Effects • Actions Actual vs. Intended Outcome Satisfy Objectives?
Desired Effects Actions COAs
GD&S Cycle
Options • •Options Options database database • •Planning Planning tools tools
MOE Developed Intel Collection Plan BDA Force Management •• Analysis Analysis •• Recommendations Recommendations
Required Capabilities by Mission Area
UNCLASSIFIED
Global GlobalForce ForceStatus Status ISR Info ISR InfoOps Ops Global GlobalStrike Strike Cyber CyberOps Ops Missile Def C2 Missile Def C2
Employment Recommendations
Other Other Capabilities Capabilities • •Diplomatic Diplomatic • •Information Information • •Economic Economic
Integrated Integratedsystem systemof: of: Plans Plans Real-time Real-timeforce forceData Data Situational Awareness Situational Awareness Analysis Analysis
USSTRATCOM J5
