Global Deterrence and Strike
UNCLASSIFIED
DETERRENCE An Evolving Concept
15 Jun 2006 LTC Randy Bentz J53, Plans Division USSTRATCOM UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Deterrence – Traditional View z
Deterrence-The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. (Joint Pub 1-02 definition)
“Deterrence by Punishment” Focus
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Deterrence Defined Deterrence: Deterrence convinces adversaries not to take actions that threaten US vital interests by means of decisive influence over their decision making. Decisive influence is achieved by credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs, while encouraging restraint by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome. (Deterrence Operations JOC, April 2006)
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
The Challenge z
Wide-array of less well understood adversaries – – –
z z
Different adversaries will require different US deterrent means Widely varying adversary risk-taking propensity –
z
Risk-taking propensity influences how an adversary sees a situation and how best to influence his perceptions
Asymmetry of stake vs. Asymmetry of power –
–
z
Deterrence is about adversary perceptions, which vary widely Increased complexity and more potential for miscalculation Both traditional nation-state and non-state actors
U.S. military supremacy alone not a guarantee of deterrence success Asymmetry of stake undercuts both the credibility of U.S. threats and the deterrent impact of credibly threatened costs
Proliferation of WMD
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
The Challenge. . . Non-State Actors
z
Unique Characteristics of Non-State Actors – –
–
– –
Identification and attribution far more difficult Greater uncertainty regarding how non-state actor decision-makers perceive costs, benefits, and risk Differ in their susceptibility to our efforts to credibly threaten cost imposition Goals, objectives, and means differ from state actors In contrast to non-state actors, deterrence of state actors is facilitated by well-established means of communications between states
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Synopsis of the Central Idea z
Must decisively influence adversary’s decision calculus – – –
z
Deterrence by Imposing Cost – –
z
Traditional view of deterrence: punishment But achieved through offensive and defensive means
Deterrence by Denying Benefit – –
z
An adversary’s perceptions are his reality Focus of planning must be on his perception, not our own Adversary decision making processes are discernable in most cases
Credible threat to deny adversary’s strategic objectives Especially important when stakes are asymmetric or addressing nonstate actors
Deterrence by Encouraging Restraint – – –
Influence adversary perceptions of what will happen if he does not act Convince adversary that he still has “room to maneuver” Not acting is the best of all available options
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Deterrence Considerations z z
Successful deterrence activities require up-front planning, not ad-hoc measures taken only in time of crises No single “magic bullet” for success –
–
z
There are multiple “ways” to deter –
–
z
All the tools of modern warfare can contribute to strategic deterrence success Much deterrence capability resides outside of DoD Planners should integrate multiple methods and not rely on any one strategy Integration will reveal necessary balances and trade-offs
Deterrence is not just a DoD or USSTRATCOM problem –
–
Requires integration and synchronization of all instruments of national power Requires regional and global perspective and integration Must “Plan to Deter”, not “Deter by Planning to Defeat”
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Strategic Decision-Making Framework • Objective: Decisively influence an adversary’s strategic decisions. • Method: Shape his perception of benefits and costs of hostile action and his perception of the costs and benefits of inaction. Illustrative Example: Deter country X from using chemical weapons in situation Y.
Adversary’s Perceived Outcomes
T C A
DO
N’ TA
Adversary Decision: “Should I use chemical weapons in this situation?”
UNCLASSIFIED
CT
Perceived Benefits: • coerce neighbors • inc. local support • etc.
Perceived Costs: • prompt US attack • loss of prestige • etc.
s ce n e qu tion e ns c Co of A
Perceived Costs: • lose initiative • military coup • etc.
Perceived Benefits: • maintain image • economic benefit • etc.
s ce n e t qu rain e ns est o C fR o
Undermine Deterrence
Enhance Deterrence Illustrative Data
UNCLASSIFIED
Core Concept: Exercising Decisive Influence Adversary’s perception is reality! Implied Nuclear Threat
Objective: Deter Iraq from using chemical weapons
Adversary’s Perceived Benefits of Action
Active Defense to counter SCUDs
Adversary’s Perceived Costs of Action
CoR
Limited US Objective: Liberation of Kuwait
Adversary’s Perceived Consequences of Restraint (CoR) (“What will happen to me if I don’t act now?”)
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Deterrence Process COLLABORATIVE PRODUCTS • Mission Statement • Prioritized list of Deterrence Operations Guidance
Single Adversary-Specific Analysis
Develop Deterrence Strategy (and develop MoEs)
• • • •
Adversary profile Decision calculus Perception uncertainties Critical Factors Influencing Adversary Perceptions
• Prioritized, adversary-specific and global deterrent strategies • Strategy MOEs • Action efficacy MOEs • Trade offs between strategies and impacts • New capabilities required
Plan and Implement
Feedback
Monitor & Analyze Effectiveness of Deterrent Strategy
UNCLASSIFIED
• Deterrence strategy integrated in plans and actions • Global Force Management insights • Metrics • Impact of actions • New insights regarding adversary perceptions
UNCLASSIFIED
Process Extension for Global Deterrence Guidance Guidance
Products Inform: Adversary Adversary #1 #1 Analysis Analysis Adversary Adversary #2 #2 Analysis Analysis Adversary Adversary #3 #3 Analysis Analysis Adversary Adversary #n #n Analysis Analysis
Assess Assess Global Global Deterrence Deterrence Coherence Coherence
• Global Force Management • Global Posture • Contingency Planning Guidance • Strategic Communications • Security Cooperation Guidance • Cross plan synchronization
Synchronize Synchronize Adversary-Specific Adversary-Specific Strategies Strategies Determine common Determine common “Global” “Global” Themes Themes
Plan Plan and and Implement Implement
Supports Supportsnational-level national-leveldecision decisionmaking making Feedback
Monitor Monitor & & Analyze Analyze Effectiveness Effectiveness of of Deterrent Activities Deterrent Activities
UNCLASSIFIED
USSTRATCOM J5
DETERRENCE An Evolving Concept
15 Jun 2006 LTC Randy Bentz J53, Plans Division USSTRATCOM UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Deterrence – Traditional View z
Deterrence-The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. (Joint Pub 1-02 definition)
“Deterrence by Punishment” Focus
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Deterrence Defined Deterrence: Deterrence convinces adversaries not to take actions that threaten US vital interests by means of decisive influence over their decision making. Decisive influence is achieved by credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs, while encouraging restraint by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome. (Deterrence Operations JOC, April 2006)
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
The Challenge z
Wide-array of less well understood adversaries – – –
z z
Different adversaries will require different US deterrent means Widely varying adversary risk-taking propensity –
z
Risk-taking propensity influences how an adversary sees a situation and how best to influence his perceptions
Asymmetry of stake vs. Asymmetry of power –
–
z
Deterrence is about adversary perceptions, which vary widely Increased complexity and more potential for miscalculation Both traditional nation-state and non-state actors
U.S. military supremacy alone not a guarantee of deterrence success Asymmetry of stake undercuts both the credibility of U.S. threats and the deterrent impact of credibly threatened costs
Proliferation of WMD
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
The Challenge. . . Non-State Actors
z
Unique Characteristics of Non-State Actors – –
–
– –
Identification and attribution far more difficult Greater uncertainty regarding how non-state actor decision-makers perceive costs, benefits, and risk Differ in their susceptibility to our efforts to credibly threaten cost imposition Goals, objectives, and means differ from state actors In contrast to non-state actors, deterrence of state actors is facilitated by well-established means of communications between states
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Synopsis of the Central Idea z
Must decisively influence adversary’s decision calculus – – –
z
Deterrence by Imposing Cost – –
z
Traditional view of deterrence: punishment But achieved through offensive and defensive means
Deterrence by Denying Benefit – –
z
An adversary’s perceptions are his reality Focus of planning must be on his perception, not our own Adversary decision making processes are discernable in most cases
Credible threat to deny adversary’s strategic objectives Especially important when stakes are asymmetric or addressing nonstate actors
Deterrence by Encouraging Restraint – – –
Influence adversary perceptions of what will happen if he does not act Convince adversary that he still has “room to maneuver” Not acting is the best of all available options
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Deterrence Considerations z z
Successful deterrence activities require up-front planning, not ad-hoc measures taken only in time of crises No single “magic bullet” for success –
–
z
There are multiple “ways” to deter –
–
z
All the tools of modern warfare can contribute to strategic deterrence success Much deterrence capability resides outside of DoD Planners should integrate multiple methods and not rely on any one strategy Integration will reveal necessary balances and trade-offs
Deterrence is not just a DoD or USSTRATCOM problem –
–
Requires integration and synchronization of all instruments of national power Requires regional and global perspective and integration Must “Plan to Deter”, not “Deter by Planning to Defeat”
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Strategic Decision-Making Framework • Objective: Decisively influence an adversary’s strategic decisions. • Method: Shape his perception of benefits and costs of hostile action and his perception of the costs and benefits of inaction. Illustrative Example: Deter country X from using chemical weapons in situation Y.
Adversary’s Perceived Outcomes
T C A
DO
N’ TA
Adversary Decision: “Should I use chemical weapons in this situation?”
UNCLASSIFIED
CT
Perceived Benefits: • coerce neighbors • inc. local support • etc.
Perceived Costs: • prompt US attack • loss of prestige • etc.
s ce n e qu tion e ns c Co of A
Perceived Costs: • lose initiative • military coup • etc.
Perceived Benefits: • maintain image • economic benefit • etc.
s ce n e t qu rain e ns est o C fR o
Undermine Deterrence
Enhance Deterrence Illustrative Data
UNCLASSIFIED
Core Concept: Exercising Decisive Influence Adversary’s perception is reality! Implied Nuclear Threat
Objective: Deter Iraq from using chemical weapons
Adversary’s Perceived Benefits of Action
Active Defense to counter SCUDs
Adversary’s Perceived Costs of Action
CoR
Limited US Objective: Liberation of Kuwait
Adversary’s Perceived Consequences of Restraint (CoR) (“What will happen to me if I don’t act now?”)
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Deterrence Process COLLABORATIVE PRODUCTS • Mission Statement • Prioritized list of Deterrence Operations Guidance
Single Adversary-Specific Analysis
Develop Deterrence Strategy (and develop MoEs)
• • • •
Adversary profile Decision calculus Perception uncertainties Critical Factors Influencing Adversary Perceptions
• Prioritized, adversary-specific and global deterrent strategies • Strategy MOEs • Action efficacy MOEs • Trade offs between strategies and impacts • New capabilities required
Plan and Implement
Feedback
Monitor & Analyze Effectiveness of Deterrent Strategy
UNCLASSIFIED
• Deterrence strategy integrated in plans and actions • Global Force Management insights • Metrics • Impact of actions • New insights regarding adversary perceptions
UNCLASSIFIED
Process Extension for Global Deterrence Guidance Guidance
Products Inform: Adversary Adversary #1 #1 Analysis Analysis Adversary Adversary #2 #2 Analysis Analysis Adversary Adversary #3 #3 Analysis Analysis Adversary Adversary #n #n Analysis Analysis
Assess Assess Global Global Deterrence Deterrence Coherence Coherence
• Global Force Management • Global Posture • Contingency Planning Guidance • Strategic Communications • Security Cooperation Guidance • Cross plan synchronization
Synchronize Synchronize Adversary-Specific Adversary-Specific Strategies Strategies Determine common Determine common “Global” “Global” Themes Themes
Plan Plan and and Implement Implement
Supports Supportsnational-level national-leveldecision decisionmaking making Feedback
Monitor Monitor & & Analyze Analyze Effectiveness Effectiveness of of Deterrent Activities Deterrent Activities
UNCLASSIFIED
USSTRATCOM J5
