Minimum Deterrence
Minimum Deterrence Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, UK. Dr. Kristan Stoddart Atomic Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston 9/10 October 2008
What is ‘Minimum Deterrence’? • Minimum deterrence is founded upon economic and political pragmatism rather than strict military criteria developed at strategic and operational branches of government. • It depends on hardware capabilities and threat perceptions and the level of destruction that is likely to deter a nuclear armed actor. • Strategy and Strategic Culture does not form in a vacuum. • They are shaped by the military capabilities, economic vitality and political values of the state. • It is a compromise between what is militarily desirable, economically affordable and politically acceptable. • Do the U.S. and Russia have a clear idea who and what they are trying to deter? 2
Counter-Force vs. Counter-Value • Differentiations between counter-force (i.e. military) and counter-value (i.e. cities or urban areas) targeting is misleading. • Military targets are often close to urban areas. • What value is there in targeting military facilities? • Are American and Russian force postures built on nuclear war fighting scenarios? • Can both sides accept mutual vulnerability will not change? • Are their postures binary or multilateral? 3
What is ‘Minimum Deterrence’? • The concept of ‘minimum deterrence’ is a moveable feast which rests in large measure on force levels and military capabilities rather than a hard rule based on certainty. • To what degree do technological capabilities determine politico-military beliefs in deterrence? • Will the forward move of technology increase or decrease the strength of belief in nuclear deterrence? • Can a concept of minimum deterrence be found which could satisfy the strategic aims of both America and Russia? • Minimum Deterrence varies from state to state. 4
Estimated Nuclear Force Structure of the P5 •
U.S. Nuclear Forces: A triad of 1,216 strategic delivery platforms. These can carry up to 4,075 nuclear warheads.
•
Russian Nuclear Forces: A triad of 682 strategic delivery platforms. These can carry up to 3,100 nuclear warheads.
•
14 strategic missile submarines. Their missiles can carry 1,728 nuclear warheads.
•
14 strategic missile submarines. Their missiles can carry 611 nuclear warheads.
•
UK Nuclear Forces: A monad of less than 160 warheads aboard four SSBNs.
•
French Nuclear Forces: A diad comprised of four SSBNs which are designed to house a majority of fewer than 300 warheads. 60 of these carried by aircraft.
•
Chinese Nuclear Forces: Triad of 112 strategic delivery platforms.
•
China has publicly stated that its warhead stockpile was the lowest of all the nuclear weapons states when Britain’s capability level was declared at fewer than 200. 5
A Palliative to a New Cold War? • SORT commit both the U.S. and Russia to reducing their nuclear stockpiles to between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed strategic warheads by 2012. • Would a single platform with 1,000 warheads each be a sufficient force posture for both the U.S. and Russia to deter each other? • Would their respective postures be sufficient to also deter other potentially hostile states? • To what extent is there a need for ‘strategic balance’? • Will a new Cold War provoke the need for a resumption of nuclear testing?
6
Positive Effects? • Remove nuclear weapons capable of ‘sub-strategic’ or tactical (battlefield) use. • Slow the generation of future strategic systems. • Increase strategic stability. • Increase political stability. • Strengthen non-proliferation efforts. • Increase confidence.
7
Negative Effects? • Encourage developing nuclear states to increase their efforts? • Invest further in conventional forces as compensation? • Weaken extended deterrence to NATO and encourage a requirement for a EU capability? • Encourage European proliferation? • Provoke insecurity in Russia? • Increase the risks of nuclear blackmail? 8
What would be the effects of the United States and Russia moving to a single strategic platform – the SSBN?
• Much simpler to count in a future arms control agreement. • SSBNs remain largely invulnerable to a pre-emptive strike. • Now capable of selective targeting with high yield warheads with a high CEP. • Reduce the likelihood of nuclear war fighting. • Prompt other states to move to a single basing platform? • Improve prospects for non-proliferation ahead of the 2010 NPT Review Conference? 9
On Nuclear Deterrence • This is not, after all, to do with technology; this is to do with how likely you think a certain contingency, how you think the other side will react to their knowledge that you have certain capabilities. That’s what it’s all about. It’s nothing whatever to do with scientists or, with respect, with generals. Denis Healey – UK Secretary of State for Defence 1964-1970. • One view, I would say the dominant view in U.S. defense planning, is that deterrence can be achieved only through difficult choices, sustained with intelligent effort, and will depend very much on the technical details. Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Minimum deterrence’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2008
10
A Return to Cold War Thinking? • War Games – Joshua MPEG
11
What is ‘Minimum Deterrence’? • Minimum deterrence is founded upon economic and political pragmatism rather than strict military criteria developed at strategic and operational branches of government. • It depends on hardware capabilities and threat perceptions and the level of destruction that is likely to deter a nuclear armed actor. • Strategy and Strategic Culture does not form in a vacuum. • They are shaped by the military capabilities, economic vitality and political values of the state. • It is a compromise between what is militarily desirable, economically affordable and politically acceptable. • Do the U.S. and Russia have a clear idea who and what they are trying to deter? 2
Counter-Force vs. Counter-Value • Differentiations between counter-force (i.e. military) and counter-value (i.e. cities or urban areas) targeting is misleading. • Military targets are often close to urban areas. • What value is there in targeting military facilities? • Are American and Russian force postures built on nuclear war fighting scenarios? • Can both sides accept mutual vulnerability will not change? • Are their postures binary or multilateral? 3
What is ‘Minimum Deterrence’? • The concept of ‘minimum deterrence’ is a moveable feast which rests in large measure on force levels and military capabilities rather than a hard rule based on certainty. • To what degree do technological capabilities determine politico-military beliefs in deterrence? • Will the forward move of technology increase or decrease the strength of belief in nuclear deterrence? • Can a concept of minimum deterrence be found which could satisfy the strategic aims of both America and Russia? • Minimum Deterrence varies from state to state. 4
Estimated Nuclear Force Structure of the P5 •
U.S. Nuclear Forces: A triad of 1,216 strategic delivery platforms. These can carry up to 4,075 nuclear warheads.
•
Russian Nuclear Forces: A triad of 682 strategic delivery platforms. These can carry up to 3,100 nuclear warheads.
•
14 strategic missile submarines. Their missiles can carry 1,728 nuclear warheads.
•
14 strategic missile submarines. Their missiles can carry 611 nuclear warheads.
•
UK Nuclear Forces: A monad of less than 160 warheads aboard four SSBNs.
•
French Nuclear Forces: A diad comprised of four SSBNs which are designed to house a majority of fewer than 300 warheads. 60 of these carried by aircraft.
•
Chinese Nuclear Forces: Triad of 112 strategic delivery platforms.
•
China has publicly stated that its warhead stockpile was the lowest of all the nuclear weapons states when Britain’s capability level was declared at fewer than 200. 5
A Palliative to a New Cold War? • SORT commit both the U.S. and Russia to reducing their nuclear stockpiles to between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed strategic warheads by 2012. • Would a single platform with 1,000 warheads each be a sufficient force posture for both the U.S. and Russia to deter each other? • Would their respective postures be sufficient to also deter other potentially hostile states? • To what extent is there a need for ‘strategic balance’? • Will a new Cold War provoke the need for a resumption of nuclear testing?
6
Positive Effects? • Remove nuclear weapons capable of ‘sub-strategic’ or tactical (battlefield) use. • Slow the generation of future strategic systems. • Increase strategic stability. • Increase political stability. • Strengthen non-proliferation efforts. • Increase confidence.
7
Negative Effects? • Encourage developing nuclear states to increase their efforts? • Invest further in conventional forces as compensation? • Weaken extended deterrence to NATO and encourage a requirement for a EU capability? • Encourage European proliferation? • Provoke insecurity in Russia? • Increase the risks of nuclear blackmail? 8
What would be the effects of the United States and Russia moving to a single strategic platform – the SSBN?
• Much simpler to count in a future arms control agreement. • SSBNs remain largely invulnerable to a pre-emptive strike. • Now capable of selective targeting with high yield warheads with a high CEP. • Reduce the likelihood of nuclear war fighting. • Prompt other states to move to a single basing platform? • Improve prospects for non-proliferation ahead of the 2010 NPT Review Conference? 9
On Nuclear Deterrence • This is not, after all, to do with technology; this is to do with how likely you think a certain contingency, how you think the other side will react to their knowledge that you have certain capabilities. That’s what it’s all about. It’s nothing whatever to do with scientists or, with respect, with generals. Denis Healey – UK Secretary of State for Defence 1964-1970. • One view, I would say the dominant view in U.S. defense planning, is that deterrence can be achieved only through difficult choices, sustained with intelligent effort, and will depend very much on the technical details. Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Minimum deterrence’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2008
10
A Return to Cold War Thinking? • War Games – Joshua MPEG
11
