nuclear security summit
Role of the Nuclear Security Summit Process SHIN Chang-Hoon
Director of the Center for Global Governance The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
- Nuclear Terrorism Threat and the Nuclear Security Summit
NUCLEAR TERRORISM THREAT
- Low probability but High consequences (disruptive)
- Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan:An act of nuclear terrorism “would thrust tens of millions of people into dire poverty” and create “a second death toll throughout the developing world.” - Since 1993, roughly 2,000 cases of illicit or unauthorized trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material
NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT
- International response to the threat: ad-hoc and piecemeal
- NSS process: ad-hoc - Three biannual summits: Washington DC (2010), Seoul (2012), Hague (2014) - Results:
1) About 6000 tons of vulnerable nuclear material has been secured 2) Participating States have brought forward initiatives and gift baskets to strengthen protection of both nuclear and other radioactive materials
- What has the 2014 Summit achieved?
TRILATERAL INITIATIVE: PROGRESS IN THE 2014 HAGUE NSS - Trilateral initiative: Strengthening the Nuclear Security Implementation 1)
Subscribe toNSS 20:Nuclear Security Fundamentals –Essential Elements in a State’s Nuclear Security Regime,
2)
Meet the intentof the recommendations contained in NSS 13:Nuclear Security Recommendations onPhysical Protection ofNuclear Material andNuclear Facilities, NSS 14;Nuclear Security Recommendations onRadioactive Material andAssociated Facilities and NSS 15;Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material outof Regulatory Control.
3)
Continue toimprove the effectiveness of theirnuclear security regimes and operators’systems, by a) conductingselfassessments; b)hostingpeer reviews (e.g., IPPAS) periodically; c) acting uponthe recommendations identified duringthese reviews;
4)
Ensure thatmanagement and personnel with accountability for nuclear security are demonstrably competent;
TRILATERAL INITIATIVE: 35 STATES
- Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Vietnam
- Possible Regional Contribution to the 2016 NSS
2014 HAGUE NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT
53 States Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Ukraine, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea,Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand,Turkey, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, United States, Vietnam
4 International Organizations European Union (observer; President of the European Council and President of the European Commission) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (observer), Interpol (observer), United Nations (observer)
6 ASEAN member States Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam (Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar: not invited)
Only 2 ASEAN member States subscribed the Trilateral Initiative: Philippines and Vietnam
REGIONAL APPROACH IN 2014 HAGUE NSS
(1) Regional Cooperation (paras. 5-7: International Cooperation): “through bilateral and regional cooperation”, “at national, regional and international level”, “stronger international and regional cooperation” (2) Regional Initiatives (para. 19): “We welcome regional initiatives, which play an important role in strengthening nuclear security collaboration within regions” (3) Voluntary measures in a regional context (para. 20) “We note that many of the States participating in this summit already take such measures, in some cases in a regional context,” (4) Illicit Trafficking (para. 32): We underscore our commitment to sharing information, best practices and expertise, subject to States’ national laws and procedures, through bilateral, regional and multilateral mechanisms in relevant areas such as nuclear detection, forensics, law enforcement, and the development of new technologies to enhance enforcement capacity of customs personnel.
REGIONAL APPROACH FOR THE 2016 SUMMIT
Cooperation with the Centers of Excellence in Northeast Asia (China, Ja pan and South Korea) Subscription of the Trilateral initiative Counter-measures against illicit trafficking
- Options after the 2016 NSS
GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
- Are they truly enough?
GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
MISSING ELEMENTS
- For a robust and sustainable process
1)
Clear definition and scope of nuclear security
2)
Clear vision and goal
3)
Clear statement of principles: individual but shared responsibility
4)
International standard for national nuclear security regime
5)
Universal participation of all members of the international community
6)
Recognition of the IAEA’s role and power
7)
Report obligation and mandatory peer review mechanism
8)
Regularized forum with continuous improvement approach
- Priorities between now and the next Summit in 2016
5 PRIORITIES FOR THE 2016 NSS 1.
Make the Global Nuclear Security Regime Comprehensive
2.
Share Information to Build Global Confidence
3.
Implement Measurable Best Practices and Standards
4.
Create a Sustainable Mechanism for Continuous Progress
5.
Offer Plans for Eliminating Civil HEU and Reducing Plutonium
The "5 Priorities" were developed by nuclear security policy experts drawn from the Fissile Materials Working Group (www.fmwg.org), Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group (www.nsgeg.org), and other well respected organizations through a very deliberate process during the last six months.
Q&A
Thank you very much
Director of the Center for Global Governance The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
- Nuclear Terrorism Threat and the Nuclear Security Summit
NUCLEAR TERRORISM THREAT
- Low probability but High consequences (disruptive)
- Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan:An act of nuclear terrorism “would thrust tens of millions of people into dire poverty” and create “a second death toll throughout the developing world.” - Since 1993, roughly 2,000 cases of illicit or unauthorized trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material
NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT
- International response to the threat: ad-hoc and piecemeal
- NSS process: ad-hoc - Three biannual summits: Washington DC (2010), Seoul (2012), Hague (2014) - Results:
1) About 6000 tons of vulnerable nuclear material has been secured 2) Participating States have brought forward initiatives and gift baskets to strengthen protection of both nuclear and other radioactive materials
- What has the 2014 Summit achieved?
TRILATERAL INITIATIVE: PROGRESS IN THE 2014 HAGUE NSS - Trilateral initiative: Strengthening the Nuclear Security Implementation 1)
Subscribe toNSS 20:Nuclear Security Fundamentals –Essential Elements in a State’s Nuclear Security Regime,
2)
Meet the intentof the recommendations contained in NSS 13:Nuclear Security Recommendations onPhysical Protection ofNuclear Material andNuclear Facilities, NSS 14;Nuclear Security Recommendations onRadioactive Material andAssociated Facilities and NSS 15;Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material outof Regulatory Control.
3)
Continue toimprove the effectiveness of theirnuclear security regimes and operators’systems, by a) conductingselfassessments; b)hostingpeer reviews (e.g., IPPAS) periodically; c) acting uponthe recommendations identified duringthese reviews;
4)
Ensure thatmanagement and personnel with accountability for nuclear security are demonstrably competent;
TRILATERAL INITIATIVE: 35 STATES
- Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Vietnam
- Possible Regional Contribution to the 2016 NSS
2014 HAGUE NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT
53 States Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Ukraine, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea,Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand,Turkey, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, United States, Vietnam
4 International Organizations European Union (observer; President of the European Council and President of the European Commission) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (observer), Interpol (observer), United Nations (observer)
6 ASEAN member States Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam (Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar: not invited)
Only 2 ASEAN member States subscribed the Trilateral Initiative: Philippines and Vietnam
REGIONAL APPROACH IN 2014 HAGUE NSS
(1) Regional Cooperation (paras. 5-7: International Cooperation): “through bilateral and regional cooperation”, “at national, regional and international level”, “stronger international and regional cooperation” (2) Regional Initiatives (para. 19): “We welcome regional initiatives, which play an important role in strengthening nuclear security collaboration within regions” (3) Voluntary measures in a regional context (para. 20) “We note that many of the States participating in this summit already take such measures, in some cases in a regional context,” (4) Illicit Trafficking (para. 32): We underscore our commitment to sharing information, best practices and expertise, subject to States’ national laws and procedures, through bilateral, regional and multilateral mechanisms in relevant areas such as nuclear detection, forensics, law enforcement, and the development of new technologies to enhance enforcement capacity of customs personnel.
REGIONAL APPROACH FOR THE 2016 SUMMIT
Cooperation with the Centers of Excellence in Northeast Asia (China, Ja pan and South Korea) Subscription of the Trilateral initiative Counter-measures against illicit trafficking
- Options after the 2016 NSS
GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
- Are they truly enough?
GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
MISSING ELEMENTS
- For a robust and sustainable process
1)
Clear definition and scope of nuclear security
2)
Clear vision and goal
3)
Clear statement of principles: individual but shared responsibility
4)
International standard for national nuclear security regime
5)
Universal participation of all members of the international community
6)
Recognition of the IAEA’s role and power
7)
Report obligation and mandatory peer review mechanism
8)
Regularized forum with continuous improvement approach
- Priorities between now and the next Summit in 2016
5 PRIORITIES FOR THE 2016 NSS 1.
Make the Global Nuclear Security Regime Comprehensive
2.
Share Information to Build Global Confidence
3.
Implement Measurable Best Practices and Standards
4.
Create a Sustainable Mechanism for Continuous Progress
5.
Offer Plans for Eliminating Civil HEU and Reducing Plutonium
The "5 Priorities" were developed by nuclear security policy experts drawn from the Fissile Materials Working Group (www.fmwg.org), Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group (www.nsgeg.org), and other well respected organizations through a very deliberate process during the last six months.
Q&A
Thank you very much
