The Nuclear Security Summit Process
The Nuclear Security Summit Process
Jor-‐Shan Choi
UC Berkeley Nuclear Research Center E-‐mail: [email protected]
18th Mee1ng of the CSCAP Study Group on Countering the Prolifera1on of Weapons of Mass Destruc1on in Asia Pacific July 7 2014, Tokai University Club, Tokyo, Japan
Viewpoints expressed here are those of the author, and not necessary those of his affiliaAons
What have been accomplished so far? 1. 2010 Washington DC Summit Ø Ø Ø Ø
BeJer awareness of risks of nuclear terrorism Agreement to lock down vulnerable materials in 4 years High-‐level aJenAon from global leaders, trickling down to organizaAons Encourage specific, tangible acAons in work plan and individual country
2. 2012 Seoul Summit Ø Ø Ø Ø
Carry forward Washington Summit goals and highlight achievement Add focus on radiological sources and interface of nuclear safety/security Explore potenAal to create a process for more far-‐reaching goals Establish joint working groups on specific topics
3. 2014 Hague Summit
Ø Japan returned 500 kg of weapons-‐grade HEU and plutonium to US & UK Ø First significant focus on plutonium as a security risk Ø A giZ basket on Strengthening Nuclear Security ImplementaAon signed by 35 countries (absent of China, India, Pakistan, and Russia) Ø Countries will host periodic peer reviews of IPPAS (InternaAonal Physical ProtecAon Advisory Service) and implement recommendaAons
4. 2016 Summit in the US (Washington DC or Chicago)
Ques1ons 1. What should Asia-‐Pacific countries prioriAze between now and the 2016 Summit? Why? 2. How can Asia-‐Pacific countries best implement the goals and objecAves of the Summit process? 3. How can the CSCAP Nuclear Energy Experts Group (NEEG) help facilitate this?
What should Asia-‐Pacific countries priori1ze between now and the 2016 Summit? Why? •
•
To ensure conAnued momentum
Ø Process – ConAnue summits? Ministerial process? Business as usual with IAEA? Ø Substance – Beyond the most vulnerable materials? other threats (e.g., radiological security)? Building capacity, such as COEs?
Why is it an issue?
The nuclear security legal framework is a patchwork; nuclear governance is weak (CPPNM amendment not-‐yet-‐entered-‐in-‐force, lack verificaAon that states are meeAng commitments)
•
Why is it important for Asia-‐Pacific?
Ø Real growth in nuclear energy will happen in Asia, despite Fukushima Ø More nuclear material with more challenges for nuclear security, safety, and safeguards/nonproliferaAon (3S) Ø An opportunity to ensure nuclear governance to keep pace with growth
Interna1onal Legal Framework for Nuclear Security Coali1on of the Willing, Membership, etc
Legally-‐bounding Instrument Selected countries in Asia Pacific
CPPNM
ICSANT
Report to UNSC 1540 CommiJee
PSI (101)
GICNT (85)
Australia
10/22/1987
3/16/2012
yes
yes
yes
Canada
2/8/1987
yes
yes
yes
China
2/9/1989
11/8/2010
yes
yes
India
4/11/2002
12/1/2006
yes
yes
Indonesia
2/8/1987
Japan
11/27/1988
yes 8/3/2007
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
DPR Korea Korea, Republic of
2/8/1987
Malaysia
yes
Mongolia
2/8/1987
New Zealand
1/18/2004
Philippines
2/8/1987
Russia
2/8/1987
10/6/2006
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
Singapore
yes
yes
yes
Thailand
yes
1/29/2007
United States
2/8/1987
yes
Vietnam
11/3/2012
yes
yes yes
yes yes
CPPNM Amendment
How can Asia-‐Pacific countries best implement the goals and objec1ves of the Summit process? •
•
Securing all vulnerable materials in 4 years
Ø The goal in first summit communique in 2010 – Deadline not met, Ø Much effort devoted in securing HEU, now to include plutonium? Ø A lot of sensiAve nuclear material is out there in the world, more will be generated as nuclear power conAnues to grow in Asia & Pacific regions.
What is the issue?
The issue of “absolute sovereignty” will plague the nuclear security regime in keeping nuclear material secure.
•
How to implement NSS process
Ø IdenAfy acAonable tasks that can be accomplished by 2016, Ø ConAnue the NSS process by technical specialists, not heads-‐of-‐states, Ø Put in place a security architecture with exisAng insAtuAons (IAEA, 3COE in Northeast Asia, etc.).
Nuclear Power In Asia • • • • • • • • • •
China and India con2nue to build new nuclear plants, ROK, Japan and China compete on export (of western reactor technology), as nuclear supply chains now move to Asia, DRPK is building its own light-‐water reactor, Vietnam will operate its 1st NPP in around 2020, Philippine may “take another look” at BNPP, Southeast Asia’s emerging economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, etc.) will cau2ously pursue their nuclear projects, Pakistan is increasing its nuclear power capacity via China, Iran is interested in building the 2nd reactor in Bushehr, Kazakhstan is interested in SMR development, Saudi Arabia may build 16 NPPs, other countries in the Middle East and North Africa are also interested in NPP. ….. And More
Nuclear Governance: Safety & Security Interface Nuclear Power Plant Accidents Three Mile Island
28 March 1979
System Failure
Chernobyl
Fukushima Daiichi
26 April 1986
11 March 2011
Human Error
Natural Disaster
Can a nuclear power plant accident be caused by design-‐basis threat? Vulnerability: ProtecAon against • Loss of ulAmate heat sink • AircraZ crash (elevated spent fuel pool) • Cyber aJack of control & instrumentaAon systems • Core damage (short-‐circuited by insiders) • Others
Nuclear Governance: Security & Safeguards Interface Impact of Fukushima on Nuclear Materials in Nuclear Fuel-‐Cycle: Significant Front-‐End:
• Reduces ~1/6 of annual global fuel demand (incl. 6 mil SWU) • Reduces the pressure brought to the enrichment market due to the expiraAon in 2013 of the US-‐RF HEU Blend-‐down Agreement • If Japan phase-‐out nuclear, then “what to do with the separated plutonium?”
Back-‐End:
Fukushima Revealed: “What to do with the spent nuclear fuel?”
Nuclear Governance: Safeguards & Safety Interface Spent Fuel in Newcomer Countries l
l l
Countries in less stable regions of the world are interested in building nuclear reactors, Leverages on spent fuel produced in these reactors are limited*, It is challenging to deal with countries’ claim for their “inalienable right” in pursuing fuel cycle technologies (a case for latent proliferaAon?).
* The 123-‐agreement between UAE and the US sApulated that UAE would not have enrichment or reprocessing
Newcomer countries need a beJer deal for managing their spent fuel – Is spent fuel take-‐back/take-‐away a viable opAon?
How can the CSCAP Nuclear Energy Experts Group (NEEG) help? Coordinate a regional approach to help Japan in recovering Fukushima Nuclear Materials Previous events happened in NWS
TMI, 1979
U.S.
Chernobyl Sarcophagus 1986
Former U.S.S.R.
Fukushima presents Japan, a NNWS
Melted Nuclear Materials to be accounted for
a 3S (Safety, Security, and Safeguards) challenge
3S Challenge for Fukushima material recovery
Prevent Terrorism
Nuclear materials are self-‐protected by radiaAon, Physical protecAon of containers required
Nuclear
Technology
Security
Special container designed for criAcality safety and corrosion resistance
Special provision for MUF, Confidence building measure with neighboring countries & global community
Safeguards Prevent Prolifera1on
Safety Prevent Accident
How can the CSCAP Nuclear Energy Experts Group (NEEG) help? Coordina1on and coopera1on among the 3 Centers of Excellence (COE) in Northeast Asia for Nuclear Security A Center of Excellence (COE) for nuclear security is a centralized locaAon where a country or region can send professionals for training in various aspects of nuclear security, such as: physical protecAon; safeguards; nuclear material control and accounAng; forensic; detecAon technologies; emergency preparedness and responses; and export controls, etc. In Northeast Asia, there are 3 COEs: Ø JAEA’s Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-‐proliferaAon and nuclear Security (ISCN) – in operaAon since 2011 Ø KINAC’s InternaAonal Nuclear Non-‐proliferaAon and Security Academy (INSA) – operaAonal in March 2014 Ø China-‐US’s State Nuclear Security Technology Center (SNSTC) – to be in operaAon in 2015 The coordinaAon and cooperaAon among these 3 COEs are essenAal for nuclear security in Northeast Asia and elsewhere.
Nuclear Security COEs in Northeast Asia
Prevent Terrorism
Safeguards, Material Control and AccounAng
COEs: nuclear security training
Safety Prevent Accident
Export Controls
Technology
Security
Emergency Preparedness and Response
Safeguards Prevent Prolifera1on
Nuclear Security: Physical ProtecAon, Nuclear Forensic, DetecAon Technology, Etc.
Jor-‐Shan Choi
UC Berkeley Nuclear Research Center E-‐mail: [email protected]
18th Mee1ng of the CSCAP Study Group on Countering the Prolifera1on of Weapons of Mass Destruc1on in Asia Pacific July 7 2014, Tokai University Club, Tokyo, Japan
Viewpoints expressed here are those of the author, and not necessary those of his affiliaAons
What have been accomplished so far? 1. 2010 Washington DC Summit Ø Ø Ø Ø
BeJer awareness of risks of nuclear terrorism Agreement to lock down vulnerable materials in 4 years High-‐level aJenAon from global leaders, trickling down to organizaAons Encourage specific, tangible acAons in work plan and individual country
2. 2012 Seoul Summit Ø Ø Ø Ø
Carry forward Washington Summit goals and highlight achievement Add focus on radiological sources and interface of nuclear safety/security Explore potenAal to create a process for more far-‐reaching goals Establish joint working groups on specific topics
3. 2014 Hague Summit
Ø Japan returned 500 kg of weapons-‐grade HEU and plutonium to US & UK Ø First significant focus on plutonium as a security risk Ø A giZ basket on Strengthening Nuclear Security ImplementaAon signed by 35 countries (absent of China, India, Pakistan, and Russia) Ø Countries will host periodic peer reviews of IPPAS (InternaAonal Physical ProtecAon Advisory Service) and implement recommendaAons
4. 2016 Summit in the US (Washington DC or Chicago)
Ques1ons 1. What should Asia-‐Pacific countries prioriAze between now and the 2016 Summit? Why? 2. How can Asia-‐Pacific countries best implement the goals and objecAves of the Summit process? 3. How can the CSCAP Nuclear Energy Experts Group (NEEG) help facilitate this?
What should Asia-‐Pacific countries priori1ze between now and the 2016 Summit? Why? •
•
To ensure conAnued momentum
Ø Process – ConAnue summits? Ministerial process? Business as usual with IAEA? Ø Substance – Beyond the most vulnerable materials? other threats (e.g., radiological security)? Building capacity, such as COEs?
Why is it an issue?
The nuclear security legal framework is a patchwork; nuclear governance is weak (CPPNM amendment not-‐yet-‐entered-‐in-‐force, lack verificaAon that states are meeAng commitments)
•
Why is it important for Asia-‐Pacific?
Ø Real growth in nuclear energy will happen in Asia, despite Fukushima Ø More nuclear material with more challenges for nuclear security, safety, and safeguards/nonproliferaAon (3S) Ø An opportunity to ensure nuclear governance to keep pace with growth
Interna1onal Legal Framework for Nuclear Security Coali1on of the Willing, Membership, etc
Legally-‐bounding Instrument Selected countries in Asia Pacific
CPPNM
ICSANT
Report to UNSC 1540 CommiJee
PSI (101)
GICNT (85)
Australia
10/22/1987
3/16/2012
yes
yes
yes
Canada
2/8/1987
yes
yes
yes
China
2/9/1989
11/8/2010
yes
yes
India
4/11/2002
12/1/2006
yes
yes
Indonesia
2/8/1987
Japan
11/27/1988
yes 8/3/2007
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
DPR Korea Korea, Republic of
2/8/1987
Malaysia
yes
Mongolia
2/8/1987
New Zealand
1/18/2004
Philippines
2/8/1987
Russia
2/8/1987
10/6/2006
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
Singapore
yes
yes
yes
Thailand
yes
1/29/2007
United States
2/8/1987
yes
Vietnam
11/3/2012
yes
yes yes
yes yes
CPPNM Amendment
How can Asia-‐Pacific countries best implement the goals and objec1ves of the Summit process? •
•
Securing all vulnerable materials in 4 years
Ø The goal in first summit communique in 2010 – Deadline not met, Ø Much effort devoted in securing HEU, now to include plutonium? Ø A lot of sensiAve nuclear material is out there in the world, more will be generated as nuclear power conAnues to grow in Asia & Pacific regions.
What is the issue?
The issue of “absolute sovereignty” will plague the nuclear security regime in keeping nuclear material secure.
•
How to implement NSS process
Ø IdenAfy acAonable tasks that can be accomplished by 2016, Ø ConAnue the NSS process by technical specialists, not heads-‐of-‐states, Ø Put in place a security architecture with exisAng insAtuAons (IAEA, 3COE in Northeast Asia, etc.).
Nuclear Power In Asia • • • • • • • • • •
China and India con2nue to build new nuclear plants, ROK, Japan and China compete on export (of western reactor technology), as nuclear supply chains now move to Asia, DRPK is building its own light-‐water reactor, Vietnam will operate its 1st NPP in around 2020, Philippine may “take another look” at BNPP, Southeast Asia’s emerging economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, etc.) will cau2ously pursue their nuclear projects, Pakistan is increasing its nuclear power capacity via China, Iran is interested in building the 2nd reactor in Bushehr, Kazakhstan is interested in SMR development, Saudi Arabia may build 16 NPPs, other countries in the Middle East and North Africa are also interested in NPP. ….. And More
Nuclear Governance: Safety & Security Interface Nuclear Power Plant Accidents Three Mile Island
28 March 1979
System Failure
Chernobyl
Fukushima Daiichi
26 April 1986
11 March 2011
Human Error
Natural Disaster
Can a nuclear power plant accident be caused by design-‐basis threat? Vulnerability: ProtecAon against • Loss of ulAmate heat sink • AircraZ crash (elevated spent fuel pool) • Cyber aJack of control & instrumentaAon systems • Core damage (short-‐circuited by insiders) • Others
Nuclear Governance: Security & Safeguards Interface Impact of Fukushima on Nuclear Materials in Nuclear Fuel-‐Cycle: Significant Front-‐End:
• Reduces ~1/6 of annual global fuel demand (incl. 6 mil SWU) • Reduces the pressure brought to the enrichment market due to the expiraAon in 2013 of the US-‐RF HEU Blend-‐down Agreement • If Japan phase-‐out nuclear, then “what to do with the separated plutonium?”
Back-‐End:
Fukushima Revealed: “What to do with the spent nuclear fuel?”
Nuclear Governance: Safeguards & Safety Interface Spent Fuel in Newcomer Countries l
l l
Countries in less stable regions of the world are interested in building nuclear reactors, Leverages on spent fuel produced in these reactors are limited*, It is challenging to deal with countries’ claim for their “inalienable right” in pursuing fuel cycle technologies (a case for latent proliferaAon?).
* The 123-‐agreement between UAE and the US sApulated that UAE would not have enrichment or reprocessing
Newcomer countries need a beJer deal for managing their spent fuel – Is spent fuel take-‐back/take-‐away a viable opAon?
How can the CSCAP Nuclear Energy Experts Group (NEEG) help? Coordinate a regional approach to help Japan in recovering Fukushima Nuclear Materials Previous events happened in NWS
TMI, 1979
U.S.
Chernobyl Sarcophagus 1986
Former U.S.S.R.
Fukushima presents Japan, a NNWS
Melted Nuclear Materials to be accounted for
a 3S (Safety, Security, and Safeguards) challenge
3S Challenge for Fukushima material recovery
Prevent Terrorism
Nuclear materials are self-‐protected by radiaAon, Physical protecAon of containers required
Nuclear
Technology
Security
Special container designed for criAcality safety and corrosion resistance
Special provision for MUF, Confidence building measure with neighboring countries & global community
Safeguards Prevent Prolifera1on
Safety Prevent Accident
How can the CSCAP Nuclear Energy Experts Group (NEEG) help? Coordina1on and coopera1on among the 3 Centers of Excellence (COE) in Northeast Asia for Nuclear Security A Center of Excellence (COE) for nuclear security is a centralized locaAon where a country or region can send professionals for training in various aspects of nuclear security, such as: physical protecAon; safeguards; nuclear material control and accounAng; forensic; detecAon technologies; emergency preparedness and responses; and export controls, etc. In Northeast Asia, there are 3 COEs: Ø JAEA’s Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-‐proliferaAon and nuclear Security (ISCN) – in operaAon since 2011 Ø KINAC’s InternaAonal Nuclear Non-‐proliferaAon and Security Academy (INSA) – operaAonal in March 2014 Ø China-‐US’s State Nuclear Security Technology Center (SNSTC) – to be in operaAon in 2015 The coordinaAon and cooperaAon among these 3 COEs are essenAal for nuclear security in Northeast Asia and elsewhere.
Nuclear Security COEs in Northeast Asia
Prevent Terrorism
Safeguards, Material Control and AccounAng
COEs: nuclear security training
Safety Prevent Accident
Export Controls
Technology
Security
Emergency Preparedness and Response
Safeguards Prevent Prolifera1on
Nuclear Security: Physical ProtecAon, Nuclear Forensic, DetecAon Technology, Etc.
